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Post-Socialist International Migration: 
The Case of China-to-South Korea Ethnic Labour Migration 
 
This paper examines an atypical south-north labour migration that emerged in the post-
socialist international migration system: China-to-South Korea ethnic labour migration. In the 
past two decades, South Korea has experienced an unprecedented increase in the arrival of 
foreign labour. The majority of the low-skilled migrant workers come from the People’s 
Republic of China. Based on a multivariate analysis of primary survey data on 525 
predominantly undocumented Chinese migrants of Korean descent in Seoul, this study 
reveals the underexplored economic dimension of ethnic migration in Northeast Asia. 
Empirical findings on this source of migrant labour in South Korea demonstrate that the 
China-to-South Korea ethnic population movement is an important yet an unknown 
dimension of the New Economics of International Labour Migration. The study suggests that 
ethnic migration from a socialist transition economy to a capital-rich economy linked through 
ancestral connections must be (re)considered in the context of the changing global migration 
and demographic landscapes, rather than the ethno-nationally romanticised view of the 
return of diaspora. 
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What is widely known as ethnic migration or ethnic return migration involves 
ancestral homeward movement of the former expatriates or their descendants after a 
significant period of displacement. Most existing studies of these particular human 
migration dynamics have focused on exploring the historical and ethno-cultural 
landscapes of the diasporas. On the other hand, the economic landscape of ethnic 
migration exposes the growing significance of the particular labour — when and 
where ethnic populations relocate in the changing global capitalist system. The case 
of China-to-South Korea ethnic labour migration is an example of this pathway that 
remains poorly understood. 
Since the diplomatic normalisation between the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1992, about 200,000 Chinese of Korean descent 
known as "Chosunjok" in Korean had come to their capitalist ancestral homeland in 
less than ten years. By the early 2000s this ethnic migrant group established as a 
primary segment of the South Korean economy's low-wage workforce. Yet the 
economic dynamism of the co-ethnic migration between the two core economies of 
East Asia is virtually unknown in the literature of both international labour migration 
and the geography of capitalism.    
 
The Chosunjok Korean minority  in China 
Today’s Korean ethnic minority population of China − Chosunjok − mainly 
originated from massive wartime expatriation. In the time span from the Japanese 
occupation through World War II (the 1910s to 1940s), more than 2.5 million 
Koreans moved to Chinese Manchuria and Japan as activists for the independence 
movement and as wartime forced labour. Today, nearly 2 million descendants of the 
Korean expellees form one of the major ethnic minority citizen groups of the 
People's Republic of China. They currently make up about 0.2% of the total Chinese 









provinces, mostly in Jilin (population 1,145,688 as of the year 2000), which includes 
the Yanbian Korean-autonomous prefecture. The other provinces are Heilongjiang 
(388,458) and Liaoning (241,052). This Korean minority population known as 
Chaoxianju
1 in Chinese are well-known to be the most educated minority population 
of the multiethnic socialist state, and they boast the highest literacy rate among all 56 
ethnic minority populations of China (Yoon, 2000; Shih, 2000; Xizhe, 2000). 
Chosunjoks of China continued to have a close connection with North Koreans 
throughout the Cold War period through the communist brotherhood and an open 
cross-border movement between the two states. However, the Chosunjok Koreans 
had no access to South Korea until 1992.  
Thus the distinction of Korean Chinese migration to the two states of the divided 
Korean peninsula – The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and 
The Republic of Korea (South Korea) − is important in this study both in terms of the 
political implications of cross-border movement and the identity of the different 
Korean communities. 
 
The discussion of the Chosunjoks and the emerging international migration of the 
Korean minority from China is very limited in the existing literature. In the 
international migration literature and in the public, Chosunjoks are often recognised 
either as Chinese or Korean immigrants. This leaves out the complex background of 
the Korean Chinese diaspora community both in the PRC and in the Chosunjoks' new 
countries of settlement, which include South Korea. In the Korean literature, 
discourse of the Chosunjok migrants has been centred on the issues related to the 'law 
for overseas Koreans' and the identity politics of the Korean diaspora. A 
concentration of earlier public interest in the law for overseas Koreans is due to the 
constitutional controversy over return rights regarding the nationality of ethnic 
Koreans from China and the former Soviet Union that evolved with their increasing 
influx to South Korea in the post-socialist period. The pre-2003 revised legislation 
                                                            
1In China “Chaoxianju” distinctively refers to the Koreans of China and North Korea, while 










disallowed visa-free entry for those extra-national Koreans travelling to South Korea 
if they had left the Korean peninsula before the foundation of the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) in 1948. Consequently, consideration of the economic implications of 
Chosunjok Chinese migration has been much more limited in comparison to political 
concerns over the ethnic population movement.    
Based upon the data of a primary survey carried out in 2003, this study explores the 
previously undocumented economic dimension of the post-1990 wave of ethnic 
migration from Northeast China to South Korea. In doing so, the study raises the 
following central questions: First, what are the underlying forces that propel the post-
1990 ethnic migration from China to South Korea? Second, what implications does 
the growing foreign labour migration influx to South Korea have for the Northeast 
Asian and international migration system? 
 
 
The new economics of ethnic migration  
  
A variety of theoretical approaches have been taken to explore what is broadly 
known as return migration. The most eminent studies of this type of international 
migration are found in post-Cold War European literature, which has more recently 
focused on the reintegration process of the former expatriates from the socialist East. 
While each study is based on different frames of reference, most of the analyses 
focus on addressing the political significances and implications of the European 
diaspora.  
In Korean literature, despite the Chosunjok migrants’ dominant de facto position as 
foreign labour migrants in South Korea, the economic dimension of the ethnic 
population movement remains underexplored. This largely owes to the same 
ethnicity of the migrant minority that is supposed to be considered in the return 
migration context rather than international labour migration. The same ethnicity 









misinterpretation of the Chosunjok’s de facto motivations and situatedness in the host 
country. 
 Da Vanzo's (1976) definitions of return and non-return migrations based on 
economic sensitivity in the migrant’s decision making are particularly useful in 
understanding the post-socialist emerging ethnic migration. According to him, when 
it comes to non-pecuniary factors such as friends and relatives, return migration is 
more responsive than non-return or labour migration. Thus, it results in less 
information and more hidden costs in the return move than in the non-return move 
(Da Vanzo, 1976:15). This definition, though it is a simple analysis, provides an 
essential clue for understanding the emerging ‘ethnic labour migration’, from the 
putatively diasporic migrant communities living in a collective trauma, to a new type 
of diaspora of global labour involving immigrants seeking better opportunities.  
 
This study attempts to explore the shrouded economic dimension of China-to-South 
Korea ethnic migration. Hypotheses are drawn and modified by key assumptions of 
the New Economics of International Labour Migration (NEILM), which test the 
underlying macro- and micro-level factors of economic decision-making of the 
ethnic labour migrants. While the neo-classical model of international migration 
views absolute wage differences as the most powerful determining factor of the 
individual’s would-be permanent migration, international migration within the Asian-
Pacific migration system is predominantly a household-level decision within a 
‘family-migration system’ (Root and De Jong 1991 et al. Boyle et al. 2003). This is 
particularly prevalent in the Northeast Asian context of migration. Most cross-border 
migrations in this Confucian culture-dominant region are chosen as a strategy to 
increase the effective savings of the household, where investment in the wellbeing of 
the family, especially the education of children (Hugo 1998 et al. Hugo 1992, 
Massey 1987, Cases 1985), is the highest priority. Such cross-border migration is 
strongly motivated by the household’s desire to improve its income position relative 









prevailing in post-reform China as well. As many have argued (Massey et al 1998), 
for those households struggling to cope with the harsh transformations of the 
capitalist development, foreign migration has become one of the most powerful 
means of overcoming market failures and widening the family’s access to resources. 
 
The mass migration of the ethnic Korean population from the post-reform economy 
of Northeast China to South Korea exemplifies this principal tendency well. Most of 
the Chosunjok migrants are parents who are devoted to the education of their 
children in the emerging Chinese economy. They have been induced to undertake 
temporary labour migration to meet the rising demands of the household unit, along 
with higher education expenditures for their children as a primary disbursement.  
In line with the new economic view, the study assumes that the ethnic labour 
migrants are “target earners” (Constant, Massey, 2002), who aim to do whatever 
temporary paid labour is available in the capital-surplus country at the expense of the 
individual migrant’s social status and cultural alienation in the country of destination. 
Despite the possibility of becoming permanent settlers as suggested by the 
cumulative causation theory of international labour migration, the Chosunjok 
migrants do wish and intend to return home when such household-level financial 
demands are either no longer critical or have been satisfactorily met. In general, for 
such target earners, selection of migration in relation to their human capital is 
relatively unimportant.  
 
Most of the temporary labour migrants endure lower socio-economic status in the 
host society than they had or could have had in their home country. The new 
economic perspective of migration postulates that upholding social prestige is 
irrelevant to one’s foreign labour. Those Chosunjok migrants who were formerly 









China, have readily accepted low status, labour-intensive jobs like childcare, 
waitressing and construction work upon arrival in their capitalist ancestral homeland.  
Despite the expected risk and high cost of illegal migration, labour in the South 
Korean service industry is seen as an inevitable option for most of the Chosunjok 
families in Northeast China. The opportunity cost of labour migration to South Korea 
is generally believed to be high. For those average Chosunjok people, temporary 
labour migration to South Korea is considered to provide lucrative opportunities,   
either to accumulate the capital that the Chosunjok migrant’s family needs in China, 
or to open a fast channel of overseas migration through which the family members 
can move out of the poverty at home in China. 
  
 Models in this study are mainly designed to identify the extent to which the volume 
and behaviour, i.e. mode of entry and legal status, of the ethnic labor migrants from 
the less developed country to the more developed ethnic home country in East Asia, 
is driven by particular socio-economic and political circumstances of both the 
sending and receiving countries. Considering the economic dimension of the ethnic 
migration is critical to ultimately understand the underlying motivations and 
ambitions of the Chosunjok Korean-Chinese migrants. 
Ethnic labour migration from Northeast China to South Korea is further considered 
under “time-specific dynamics”.  This study takes the mid-1990’s into consideration, 
dividing this period into the years before 1995 and from 1995 onward. The mid-
1990’s has been chosen as a politically and economically influential variable in the 
context of both the sending and receiving countries of the migration.  
In the Chinese context, what is known as “internal reform policies” (IOM 2003), 
which were undertaken by the central government amidst the socialist state’s intense 









particularly from the former State Owned Enterprises (SOE) industry concentrated in 
the Northeast provinces. It is argued that a historic turning point in post-socialist 
China’s economy came in 1996, when the national economy crossed the structural 
threshold from a chronic shortage economy punctuated by inflationary cycles, to an 
oversupply economy mired in deflationary pressures (Lin, 2003:14). In particular, 
privatisation of the SOEs and lay-offs of state workers began to occur on a large 
scale in 1995 (Qian, 1999).  That situation is considered to have had a significant 
impact on the living conditions of people in the Northeast region. It has been 
reported that by the end of 1996, up to 70 percent of small SOEs had been privatized 
in those traditionally SOE concentrated Northeast provinces.  This resulted in about 
ten million lay-offs from the SOEs and an additional 11.5 million lay-offs in 1997 
(Qian 1999:21).  
 
 The rising protests of tens of thousands of workers from the formerly state-owned 
mining industry, claiming overdue wages and new reforms designed to save the 
fading economy of the Northeast, demonstrate the deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions. These were also manifested in the increasing geographical inequalities 
which have emerged since marketisation. Reforms of the economy have radically 
restructured the geographical and social patterns of China. In crude terms, the 
growing regional, local and intra-provincial disparity (Wei and Ye 2004) is often 
referred as the ‘coast-interior gap’.  
The greatest polarisation has been observed between the provinces of the interior 
which include the former state-owned heavy industry economies of north-east (the 
Chosunjok heartland) and Beijing; and the Special Economic provinces of the south-
eastern coastal region including Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu and 
Sangdong. In terms of growth rate, development in the interior provinces has been 
much slower than those of the coastal regions. According to Brooks and Tao (2003), 
while the urban unemployment rate during 1990-2001 in Beijing ranged from 1.2 









notably Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang have been estimated at 8.9%, 7.5% and 
8.4% respectively, rates far higher than the national average of 5.6 percent during the 
same period.  
It is argued that the shifting political economies and the massive re-structuring of the 
nation’s socio-economic system has not only widened income disparity in the 
absolute sense, but also deepened social divisions (Fan 1995, Wei & Ma 1996: 
Zhao& Zhang 1999 in Wei & Ye 2003). The massive internal and international 
displacement of labour from the waning regional and deprived rural economies of the 
country to both the capital-rich coastal regions and foreign countries is considered to 
be one major consequence of the uneven development.  
 Yet the lack of official and systematic aggregate data on the regional and inter-
provincial disparity of the post-reform socialist state has made it difficult to identify 
the wide range of problems that are faced by the people of China in different regions 
(Wang and Zhang et al., 2003; Wei and Ye, 2004).   
 
In the Korean context, the mid-1990s have a number of important implications that 
could well permeate the experiences of both legal and illegal Chinese and Chinese of 
Korean descent migrant workers, as well as other foreign labourers who were 
absorbed by its industries. A recent study by the Korean Labour Institute shows that 
the South Korean labour market for the so-called 3-D (Dangerous, Dirty and 
[physically] Demanding) industries reached equilibrium in 1995 for the first time 
since the shortage of manual labour began in the late 1980s.  
The supply of unskilled manpower was expanded via the ‘trainee system’ promoted 
by the state throughout the early 1990s. The post-1995 period also has political 
significance in determining whether the large influx of foreign labour would flourish. 
An immigration system that was unique to South Korea and Japan was the guest 
worker policy. Until the early 2000s this had been the only ‘official’ route of entry 
for unskilled foreign labour. The trainee system in Korea was introduced in 1992 









widely believed that until the early 1990s, when such regulations were implemented, 
about 10,000 informal migrant workers had been tacitly utilised in the Korean 3-D 
industries. Official import of foreign labour escalated in 1995 with the enactment of 
a new policy called the ‘guidelines for protection and management of foreign 
trainees'. More recent changes include new systems that have been implemented to 
further facilitate the access of foreign labour into the Korean economy’s both low- 
and skilled labour-starved industries (Table 3). 
 
 From 1995 onward, the government gradually enlarged the annual quota of foreign 
labour admissions from less than 40,000 up to a maximum of 80,000 (Figure 1).  
 




























Source: OECD (2001b) et al Ministry of Justice (2000) 
The sectors in which foreign trainees were allowed to work also expanded from 
merely the manufacturing industry to agricultural, service and other small-scale, 
labour-short sectors. Between 1995 and 1996, another 50,000 foreign labourers were 









recent statistical report on the number of foreign trainees by nationality, Chinese 
make up the largest population (23,254), of which over half are of Korean descent. 
This is estimated at 16,388, among a total 78,612 foreign trainees (Korean Federation 
of Small & Medium Business 2001 et al. Korea Labour Institute, 2001). These 
political conditions and policy changes are considered to have played a significant 
role in intensifying the influx of labour from Northeast China in the mid-1990s.  
In order to examine the above mentioned economic dynamics of the ethnic 
population movement from Northeast China to Korea, the following propositions are 
formulated and tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Emerging ethnic labour migration from China to Korea exemplifies 
the new economics of labour migration that is primarily driven by the relative 
deprivation of the minority community’s households and their pursuit of higher 
capital accumulation in a foreign labour market.  
Hypothesis 2: The post-1995 migration of the Chosunjok, in contrast to the 
movement in the pre-1995 period, is strongly determined by the household’s rising 
demand for investment in human capital through the education of their children.  
Hypothesis 3: Illegal migration (both by mode of entry and overstay) of the 
Chosunjok more likely applies to negatively selected migrants and to the post-1995 
period than to those positively selected migrants and the pre-1995 period.  
 
 
Methods and data  
 
Given the predominantly illegal status of Chosunjok migrants, no clear population 
listing was available, and therefore no formal probability sample could be drawn 
from the study. Instead, alternative means of access were developed with the 
understanding that the generalisation of results is limited to the group observed.  
The survey relied on a rather unconventional combination of various techniques. 









convenience sample and a cluster sampling design, generated the sample of 
respondents. Procedures linked to the former sampling strategy included purposive 
and site-sampling techniques that were facilitated during the action research 
(Checkland 1998) based in Guro-Gu, Seoul. The Guro district, which was the heart 
of urban shantytowns for native factory workers from 1960 to 1980, was established 
as the capital’s ghetto for underprivileged Asians during the 1990s, particularly 
Chinese national migrant workers. It is widely alleged that the Guro and Guemcheon 
‘Gus included over 30,000 Chosunjok Korean-Chinese and another 20,000 Han 
























Figure 2 Chinese Enclaves in Seoul Metropolitan City 
 












The study areas included 27 percent of an estimated 110,000 Chosunjok migrants in 
the country, and provided a good locale for generating the cluster sampling. As stated 
earlier, the vast majority of the 525 surveyed in 2003 were illegal immigrants, either 
by mode of entry or over-stay.  
Table 1 Composition of the surveyed migrants by legal status   
Total number of respondents  525      Percentage (100)       
Legal by all means other than 
naturalisation  
84          16 % 
*Legal by naturalisation  42          8.0 % 
Illegal  350          76 % 
*Among legals, naturalisation by marriage to a Korean citizen (usually Chosunjok women to 
South Korean men) was one of the primary methods of achieving legal status 
    
About one-third of the respondents were involved in the Christian (church) 
organisation-based migrant communities and attended services regularly as an 
expression of their religious beliefs. Another third of respondents said they 
maintained contact with the migrant communities primarily to gather and exchange 
information about work and modifications in immigration regulations. Other reasons 
for having frequent contact with these humanitarian organisations and migrant 
communities included: help in finding jobs (2.1%), meeting and making friends from 
home and to alleviate loneliness (7.7%). Although not all respondents claimed this 
area was their pre-migration intended destination, more than three-quarters of 
respondents (77.8%) said that South Korea was the top destination to go to for 
foreign labour. Thus, the logistic regression models estimated for this study focus on 
the socio-economic circumstances that influenced the ‘labour migration’ of Korean 
Chinese to Korea, relative to the circumstances of the migrants in the 1990s.  
 









and work either formally or informally in South Korea on a temporary stay basis. 
Most of them were given temporary foreign resident status, such as C-3 (multiple 
purpose temporary/90-days stay) and D-3 (industrial trainee) on initial admittance to 
Korea. According to the Statistical Yearbook of Immigration Control in 2002, nearly 
58% of the total documented Chosunjok migrants had entered South Korea on two of 
the visa types (12,635 with C-3 and 1,254 with D-4) instead of the F-1 visa (1,553), 
which is specifically issued to extra-national Koreans for a temporary visit of their 
relatives in South Korea.   
 
In order to ensure a consistent comparison of models, the logistic regression analysis 
of the study was completed using 371 valid cases in the sample, excluding blank 
responses in the database.  
Because most of the migrants from China were extremely unfamiliar with and 
anxious about official surveys, the questionnaire was designed to collect qualitative 
information, an approach designed to improve the response rate. This categorical 
information is captured in sets of dichotomous variables. The nature of the 
Chosunjok’s migration is divided by ‘economic’ (economically determined 
migration) and ‘non-economic’ (non-economically determined migration) 
motivations. The basic response variables are composed of a set of three dummy 
variables: ‘economic and non-economic’, ‘pre-1995 and post-1995(1995 onward) 
migration,’ and ‘legal and illegal status of immigration’. 
 
Migration to South Korea is used as a key response variable for the models of the 
various hypotheses. The dependent variable is defined as economically-determined 
migration (labour migration) that is primarily motivated by the desire to save enough 
money in order to cover the education fees of their children. In contrast, the non-
pecuniary motivations for migration (non-economic migration) include: a nostalgia 
toward the motherland Korea & visiting (blood) relatives (14.2%); curiosity about 









application for Korean citizenship to reclaim pre-1948 Korean nationality (3.4%); 
marriage to a Korean (6.2 %); study (2.4%); and other reasons (6.4%).   
The key explanatory variables of the multivariate statistical analysis consist of a set 
of dummy variables (Table 2). In addition to the human capital and demographic 
variables such as age, sex, marital status, skill achievement, educational level, and 
wage difference required for testing the principal assumptions of labour migration, 
this study also includes more contextual variables such as family status, which is 
based upon whether or not the migrant has dependent children, type of school(s) 
attended, political party membership in China, and intended (i.e. initially planned) 























Table 2 Details of variables used in multiple analysis  
Names of variables  Reference categories & scoring 
Economic migration=1   Migration to Korea-Xb4 (response 
variable)  Non-economic migration =0 
Over 40 (with age 40+) =1 
Age at time of migration-Pre_xa1  Under 40=0 
Female=1 
Gender-a2sex  Male=0 
Have child(ren) to raise at home=1 
Family status-Xa4  Have no child =0 
Married =1  
Marital status-XXa4  Unmarried/single =0 
Less than secondary/high school=1 
Level of education-Xa6  More than secondary/high school education=0 
Korean minority school(s) only =1 
Type of school(s) attended-Xa7  Both Han majority and Ethnic minority schools =0 
Unskilled job=1 
Type of occupation at home in China-Xa8 
Skilled job=0 
Unemployed=1  Employment status at home in China- 
XXa8unem  Otherwise=0 
Non-member of the communist party or no 
political interest=1  Communist party membership in China- 
Xa9  Communist party member=0 
Temporary (target earning stay)=1  Intended duration of foreign labour stay  in 
Korea-Xb6intst  Otherwise(permanent stay in mind)=0 
Higher at least 2-5 or more times than the 
earning at home=1  Income difference-Xc6_Incd 
Otherwise=0 
Social (network) capital-Xb8SOC  Having a interpersonal tie established prior to 
migration to the destination country=1 
   Otherwise=0 
  
While the most common demographic profile of an international migrant is one of a 
young, single male, as suggested by the neoclassical economic interpretation of 
international labour migration, the respondents in this study present an atypical 
composition. Here, an older generation (age 40+) is used as the reference group. 
According to the Statistical Yearbook of Immigration Control, 2002, those aged 40 
and over make up 63 percent of the total registered Chosunjok Korean Chinese 
migrants and 60 percent of ‘self-reported’ illegal Chosunjoks during the amnesty 









whom they wish to offer college education. The study presumes that rising family 
expenditure on education in post-reform China is a key incentive for low status 
foreign labourers among second generation Chosunjok parents.  
Evidence that the middle-aged demographic profile of the Chosunjok immigration is 
not simply an artefact of the South Korean government’s earlier ‘ageist’ policy which 
gave preference to older people (i.e. first and second generations of Korean 
expellees) for the grant of temporary visas, comes from several sources: (1) The 
middle-aged demographic character of Korean Chinese migrant workers persisted 
even when the age restrictions had been dropped in South Korea; (2) The middle-age 
bias is also evident in other destination countries of Chosunjok migrants such as 
Japan, and more recently the US metropolitan areas like Los Angeles and New York 
City. Given the above situation, respondent’s familial status was considered a key 
explanatory variable in addition to marital status.  
 
The type of school(s) attended in China was included as an important human capital 
variable that demonstrated advantage in terms of both human and social capital in the 
source country.  
 Those educated only in the Korean national minority school are assumed to be the 
Chosunjok who have lived in a monolingual and more ethno-nationally bounded 
environment; one’s socioeconomic network is more likely to be limited in the ethnic 
Korean enclave. These respondents are assumed to be more likely to choose to 
migrate to Korea. The others include the cases of the migrants who have been 
educated both in Han majority and ethnic Korean minority school(s) and are 
therefore bilingual; they are more likely to have a socioeconomic advantage or be 
more easily assimilated into the mainstream Han majority society and consequently 
better off in China.  
 
Political party membership is added as one significant human capital measure of the 
migrant from the socialist state, China. The respondents who were non-communist 









capital and are thus negatively selected migrants. Income difference that is the 
principal measure of the neoclassical economic theory of migration is also 
considered in the analysis.  
As a test of the tendency towards ‘target earning,’ a key assumption of the new 
economic theory of ILM, respondents were asked to report their ‘intended’ duration 
of foreign labour and stay in Korea. The reference group are those who intended a 
temporary stay that would end 'upon reaching a set accumulation of savings'. The 
other respondents included those who had no time limitation in mind or those who 
intended a possible permanent stay before undertaking the migration. 
The study assumes that virtually all legal and illegal Korean Chinese labour migrants 
transfer their migrant savings to their family members in China, either in the form of 
remittances or an informal money transfer as observed in the findings of the 
ethnographic survey of the target population.  Ninety-nine percent of those surveyed 
declared that they send part of their earnings in Korea to their family members in 
China. Given the illegal immigration status of the vast majority of Chosunjok 
migrant workers in Korea, most of the migrants use informal and in-person methods 
of money transfer. This makes the official estimation of the volume and value of 
remittances of the migrant population difficult. Thus, while the rate and volume of 
remittance is typically considered for the test of macro-level economic developments 
in the country of origin, in the new economic models of migration, no remittance-
specific variable has been included.  
 
All of the key socio-demographic variables are further considered in post-1990s 
temporal dynamics. The massive influx of Korean Chinese labour did not 
immediately follow the post-war diplomatic normalisation that took place between 
the Republic Korea and the People’s Republic of China in 1992. Rather, the inflow of 
ethnic migrants and of illegal immigrants from China sharply increased in the mid-
1990s. For this reason, a variable that controlled pre-1995 migration versus post-









what extent, the post-1990 temporal dynamics influence selected determinants of 
economic migration. However, the period of the Asia Pacific region’s financial crisis 
that occurred between 1997 and 1998 has not been taken into account, since this 
event has apparently only resulted in a short-term structural change and thus is a 
minor influence on the patterns of unskilled labour migration. In the long run, the 
Asian crisis has affected long-term mobility trends in the Pacific Asian region as a 
whole (see Athukoralge, P, 1999 and Manning, C, 2000).  
A spatial dimension, which considers differences in the migrant’s place of origin in 
their home country, was not included in the model; only 0.6 percent of respondents 
were from outside the three Korean minority populations concentrated in the 




Findings and discussion 
 
Information was collected in an attempt to represent the most important dimension of 
a priori variability, and to reflect variability in status-based and demographic 
characteristics. That being said, a descriptive statistical analysis was used to more 
effectively summarise the complex direct and indirect relationships previously 
hypothesised. Tests of statistical inference in the study do not therefore claim 
generalisation, but typicality of the case and internal validity (Massey 1987). Overall, 
as a measure of precision and reliability, the findings of the study can be used within 
a broader framework to discuss the relative strength of relationships and the 
substantive significance and implications of key findings. 
The descriptive statistics of Table 3 show binary relationships between explanatory 
and responsive variables in the primary data of the survey (for example between 









provides some information on the socio-demographic background of the migrant 
group prior to obtaining more sophisticated results of multiple logistic regression 
analysis.  This allows us to identify a set of potentially influencing factors 
(likelihood) of the Chosunjok community’s post-1990 exodus to South Korea. This is 















































 All Chosunjok migrants  (total N=525)  Number of responses  
Economic (n=310)  Non-economic (n=215) 
Before 1995          1995 onward 
Economic Non-economic   Economic   Non-economic     
N=46 (%) n=38 (%) n=264  (%) n=177  (%) 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
Age  
   
20-29 0  (0) 1  (2.6) 9  (3.4) 29  (16.4) 
30-39 6  (13) 8  (21.1) 37  (14.0) 30  (16.9) 
40-49 13  (28.3) 9  (23.7) 110  (41.7) 31  (17.5) 
50-59 16  (34.8) 9  (23.7) 78  (29.5) 61(34.5) 
60 or over  7 (15.2) 9  (23.7) 24    (9.1) 22  (12.4) 
Sex              
Female 19  (41.3) 23  (60.5) 145  (54.9) 103(58.2) 
Male 22  (47.8) 13  (34.2) 105  (39.8) 69(39.0) 
Family status              
Have child(ren)    24 (58.7) 19  (50.0) 160  (60.6) 75  (42.4) 
Have no child(ren)  13 (31.7) 11  (28.9) 75  (28.4) 85  (48.0) 
Marital status               
Married   27 (58.7) 22  (57.9) 187  (70.8) 106  (59.9) 
Unmarried  8 (17.4) 7 (18.4) 43  (16.3) 46  (26.0) 
Education              
More than secondary/high school  6 (13) 5  (13.2) 17  (6.4) 29  (16.4) 
Less than secondary/high school  40 (80.7) 33  (86.8) 247  (93.6) 148  (83.6) 
Type of school(s) attended             
Korean minority school(s) only   33 (71.7) 22  (57.9) 181(68.6) 111  (62.7) 
Both Han majority and Ethnic 
minority schools   6 (13) 12  (31.6) 67  (25.4) 56  (31.6) 
Occupation at home (in China)            
Unskilled (manual)  29 (63) 15  (39.5) 138  (52.3) 101  (57.1) 
Skilled (non-manual)  14 (30.4) 19  (50.0) 117  (44.3) 73  (41.2) 
Employment status in China               
Unemployed   2 (4.3) 2  (5.3) 17  (6.4) 6  (3.4) 
Employed   41 (89.1) 32  (84.2) 238  (90.2) 168  (94.9) 
Current occupation (in Korea)                 
Unskilled   42 (91.3)  25 (65.8) 239  (90.5) 146  (82.5) 
Semi-skilled & skilled  4 (8.7)  13 (34.2) 25  (9.5) 31  (17.5) 
Political party membership in 
China        
Communist party member & pro-
state-socialism  25 (54.3) 21  (55.3) 155  (58.7) 79  (44.6) 
Non-communist party member or 









Intended duration of stay in 
Korea             
Temporary only (return upon 
meeting targeted capital 
accumulation)  
27 (58.7) 12  (31.6) 198  (75) 74  (41.8) 
No time limited plan or possible 
permanent stay  13 (28.3) 21  (55.3) 49  (18.6) 94  (53.1) 
Income difference         
2-5 times higher or over  46 (100) 35  (92.1) 259  (98.1)  170  (96.0) 
Below 2 times or no actual 
difference    0 3  (7.9) 5  (1.9)   7 (4.0) 
 
 
 I define four key dimensions using the nature and timing of migration, namely 
economic (economically determined migration) versus non-economic (non-
economically determined migration) and before 1995 vs. from 1995 onwards. The 
larger volume of economic migration in the post-1995 time is clearly observable. 
There is a sharp increase of migration in the post-1995 time compared to the pre-
1995 time. In addition, I identify a difference in the age structure of the migrant 
flows of pre-1995 and post-1995; the inflow of young migrants between 20 and 39 
was significantly larger during the latter period (Table 3)   
In the descriptive statistics of Table 3, it is interesting to notice that those who 
claimed to be non-economic migrants are characterised by a high proportion of 
respondents with incomes at least 2-5 times higher than in China; this pattern is 
apparent for migrants both in the pre-1995 period (92.1%) and the post-1995 period 
(96%) in South Korea. This indicates that most of the Chosunjok migrants are 
ultimately engaged in earning activities in the host country.   
The chi-square analysis of Table 4 displays the simple relationships between all 
(without concerning the temporal and legal dimensions), economically-determined 
migration and key socio-demographic characteristics. 
 









   Table 4 Chi-Square analysis of labour migration of Chosunjok in relation to key 
 socio-demographic  factors 
 
Age at time of migration  8.809   0.003 
Sex 3.118    0.528 
Family status  11.838   0.001 
Marital status   7.111   0.010 
Level of education  14.018   0.000  
Type of (ethnic) school(s) attended in China  4.753   0.035 
Type of occupation in China  0.257   0.670 
Employment status in China  1.955   0.240 
Communist party membership in China  5.243   0.026 
Intended duration of stay in Korea   71.839   0.000 
Income difference   5.097   0.030 
Social network capital   0.045   1.000 
*N= 371     
 
 
According to the chi-square significance test of Table 4, those who are older, 
married, have children at home, attended ethnic Korean schools only, have less 
education, no communist party membership, intend a temporary stay/foreign labour 
and expected and experienced at least 2-5 times higher incomes (earnings) are highly 
correlated to the economic migration of Chosunjok to Korea. 
Interestingly, the chi-square analysis demonstrates that social capital (namely, having 
a migrant social network established prior to the move to Korea, which is widely 
deemed to be one of powerful forces of initial migration) has no strong association 
with the Chosunjok’s migration to South Korea. In this survey, fewer than 12% of the 
total respondents said that they undertook their migration to Korea whilst primarily 
relying on the assistance of their social network. This can be explained in two ways: 
1) immigration of the Chosunjok to Korea is so far only a decade-long phenomenon 
which began to flourish in the mid-1990s. Thus, interpersonal ties among Chosunjok 
migrants have not been strong enough to entice and sustain their foreign labour 
migration. 2) According to the preliminary survey in the study, motivation (and 
commitment) to build social networks among the mostly temporary Chosunjok 









For example, of the migrants surveyed in response to questions about ‘social life in 
Korea’, 13 percent said they engaged in manual labour in excess of 10 hours per day 
and had no time to meet people or socialise , while 2.6 percent said they had no close 
friend(s) in Korea.  
 
Indeed, both as individuals and as part of a group, the Chosunjok migrants tend to 
have a weaker solidarity compared to other minority populations in the host country. 
Upon comparison of this migrant group to South Asian labour migrant communities, 
such as Catholic Filipinos and Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim minority groups in 
the receiving society this becomes clear. South Asian migrants bond over similar 
social and religious ideas and tend to take more initiative to organise collective 
activities.  
In general, the Chosunjok target-earning migrants from the socialist state of China 
have no strong religious background and tend to value community activities to a 
lesser degree. According to the study’s ethnographic observation, this social isolation 
appears to be more dominant among those Chosunjok labourers who hail from white-
collar backgrounds in China. Preserving their self-esteem is quite important for most 
hard working Chosunjok migrant labourers who earn their livings through low-status 
and low-wage jobs. Primarily, this constitutes the concealment of their low-skilled 
and low-class status from others in the host society, particularly from those who 
originate from their heartland — the Northeast Chinese provinces. 
On the other hand, the majority of the Chosunjok migrant workers found it far easier 
to get along with people from China than with native South Koreans. Overall, both 
survey findings and ethnographic observations of the analysis population attest that 
the majority of Chosunjoks in South Korea are highly goal-oriented, target earning 
and individualistic.  
The logistic regression analysis of Table 5 shows the likelihood of economic 
migration of Korean Chinese in relation to selected human capital variables without 







Table 5 Logistic Regression models for key features and likelihood of labour migration of Chosunjoks to South Korea  
 
    Response variable  
    Economic Migration of Chosunjok to Korea (n=371) 
Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D 
Explanatory variables 
B sig.  Exp(B) B sig.  Exp(B) B sig.  Exp(B) B sig.  Exp(B) 
Age at time of migration  0.362  0.183 1.436   0.365  0.173 1.441         0.513  0.046 1.670  
Family status  0.661  0.076 1.937   0.675  0.066 1.964   0.748  0.003  2.113   -  -   
Marital status  0.008  0.985 1.008   -0.034  0.934 0.967   -  -    0.612  0.031 1.844  
Level of education  1.298  0.001 3.662   1.203  0.001 3.330   1.269  0.000  3.557   -  -   
Type of school(s) attended in China  0.296  0.294  1.344   0.267  0.337 1.306         -  -   
Type of occupation in China  -0.161  0.544 0.851   -  -    -  -    -  -   
Employment status at home in 
China   -  -   -  -   -  -    1.089  0.074 2.971   
Political party membership in 
China  -0.386  0.137 0.680   -0.356  0.165  0.700   -  -    -  -   
Intended duration of stay   1.909  0.000  6.746   1.928  0.000  6.876   1.954  0.000  7.057   1.948  0.000  7.015  
Income difference  1.516  0.063 4.554   -  -                 1.373  0.074 3.947   
Constant    -3.927  0.000   -2.446  0.000   -2.357  0.000   -5.134  0.001  
Estimated Odds  1.633      1.634      1.617      0.310     
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  11.308  0.185   12.286  0.139  6.468  0.263  8.866  0.181  
-2 Log likelihood  394.901  399.112     405.296     409.572     
Cox & Snell R-Square  0.245  0.236     0.223     0.214     




 Model A is the reference category tested with all hypothesised correlated variables, 
which include age at time of migration, family status, level of education, type of 
school(s) attended, type of occupation in China, Communist party membership, 
intended duration of stay in Korea and income difference. Model B was sequentially 
tested with the variables that showed significant correlation to the dependent variable 
in the first chi-square analysis of the data (Table 5). Testing of the exploratory Model 
C includes only the variables with a high p-value − namely family status as measured 
by having children at home, lower education, and intention of temporary foreign 
labour stay overseas (i.e., S. Korea) – and were entered using stepwise method. 
Model C appears to provide microeconomic level decision making characterisation 
of the likelihood of labour migration of Chosunjok. It shows that while having 
children to raise at home and lower educational achievements have positive 
correlation and strong influences on the economic migration of Chosunjok to Korea, 
intention to stay on a temporary visa indicates the strongest influence on the labour 
migration of the migrant group.  
Model D is tested with theoretically powerful explanatory variables only. Drawn 
from both neoclassical economics and new economics of migration, these variables 
include age (younger), marital status (single), and employment status (unemployed), 
and intended duration of foreign labour stay (temporary) and income difference.  
The prediction equation formula for the reference model category of hypothesis I (all 
cases) can be presented as: 
Odds (economic migration) = 
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 While some variables included in model A, B and D do not suggest significance, 
odds of the model A, B. C show consistent outcome (all odds values are higher than 
1), indicating the likelihood of economic migration being higher than non-
economically determined migration in relation to the selected explanatory variables. 
This confirms that hypothesis I is accepted within the 371 valid cases of the study 
sample, subject to the factors with which this hypothesis is concerned. 
 The chi-square significance test in Table 6 shows a correlation of key socio-
demographic and economic factors to labour migration of Chosunjoks in the pre-





 Table 6 Chi-Square analysis of Chosunjoks’ labour migration in the pre-1995 and the post-1995 periods 
Before 1995 (n=43)  From 1995 onward (n=328) 
Independent variables  
χ
2  Sig.(2-tailed)  χ
2  Sig.(2-tailed) 
Age at time of migration   0.512  0.547  8.224  0.005 
Sex  3.249 0.197 1.728 0.421 
Family status  0.705  0.509  11.538  0.001 
Marital status   0.179  0.728  7.251  0.009 
Level of education  0.179  0.728  15.244  0.000  
Type of (ethnic) school(s) attended in  China  3.521 0.079 2.879 0.107 
Type of occupation in China  5.581  0.031  0.139 0.734 
Employment status in China  0.811  1.000  1.431  0.334 
Political party membership in China  0.029  1.000  6.270   0.013 
Intended duration of stay in Korea  12.352  0.001  59.451  0.000  
Income difference   4.074  0.079  1.845  0.271 






 According to the chi-square analysis in Table 6, only type of occupation (being 
unskilled) in China and intention of temporary stay are associated with labour 
migration at a significant level in pre-1995. In the post-1995 period, older age 
migrants, having children, being married, lower education, no communist party 
membership and intention of a temporary stay are all significantly correlated to 
economic migration of Korean Chinese. In both the pre-1995 and post-1995 periods, 
sex and ‘unemployment’ are not significantly correlated to the Korean Chinese 
population’s economically determined migration.  
 A non-significant correlation of unemployment to economic migration may be due 
in part to the high rate of officially invisible and quasi-unemployed ‘laid off’ former 
employees of SOEs in the three Northeast Chinese provinces. In fact, currently in 
official statistics on national unemployment, the Chinese communist state does not 
include about 26 million total laid off workers. It is alleged that there are an 
estimated 15.2 million quasi-unemployed lay-offs in the Northeast provinces 
(China.org.cn December 28, 2003). 
The logistic regression analysis shown in Table 7, controlling for year of migration, 
shows the overall difference (different influential factors) in the pre- and post-1995 
periods of economic migrations of the Korean-Chinese population. The odds for 
Models A (reference category) and D (theory category) for each of the periods with 
the same explanatory variables show contrasting results.  Whereas the odds of pre-
1995 migration are less than , the odds of the post-1995 migration are greater than1. 
When controlling for the given factors, this difference indicates that post-1995 
migration of Korean-Chinese is likely to be economic, while pre-1995 migration is 
likely to be non-economic.  
In post-1995 migration, all models—except the theory testing Model D—show a 
positive correlation between new economic decision-making factors, such as having 
children to raise and the intention of (foreign labour) a temporary stay with labour 
migration of Korean-Chinese to Korea. Model C of post-1995 migration 
demonstrates the positive relation and strong influence of having children to raise, 
lower education, Communist Party membership and intention of staying in Korea 






Interestingly, in the survey sample, no Communist Party membership in China  
appears to  correlate negatively to the economic migration of  Chosunjok in Models 
A, B and C of post-1995 migration.  
 Conversely, this means that those ethnic Koreans who had Communist Party 
membership, and therefore tended to have a higher educational background as well 
as higher aspirations both for upward mobility and a good education for their 
children in the post-reform Chinese society, are more likely to migrate to South 
Korea in the post-1995 period. This underpins the key hypothesis of the new 
economics of labour migration (Stark, Taylor 1991), which proposes that the 
propensity of outward migration is not the highest among the poorest villages or 
local economies. Migration rates are higher from those areas or regions with an 
uneven level of development, that is, where the distribution of income is less equal 
and the reference group plays a significant role. Labour migration of the Chosunjok 
population from Northeast China which emerged in the post-1990 period, epitomises 
such a case. While the Chosunjok Korean Chinese community does not form the 
poorest social group in the local economy of China, their risky foreign labour 
migration is undertaken as a vital means of increasing their households’ income 
compared to the  relevant reference group. 
 
Prediction equation for the reference model of HYP II (before 1995 &1995 onwards) 
is formulated as: 
Odds (economic migration=yes) =  
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Table 7 Logistic regression model of pre-1995 time labour migration of 
Chosunjoks by selected key socio-economic and demographic characteristics  
  Pre-1995 labour migration of Chosunjok (n=43)  
Model A  Model D 
Explanatory variables 
B sig.  Exp(B)  B  sig.  Exp(B) 
Age at time of migration  0.752   0.493  2.121   0.799   0.336   2.223  
Family status  1.265   0.636  3.543   -  -  - 
Marital status  0.153   0.956  1.165   0.617   0.501   1.853  
Level of education  0.120   0.922  1.127   -  -  - 
Type of school(s) attended in 
China  0.621   0.603  1.861   -  -  - 
Type of occupation in China  1.372   0.245  3.943   -  -  - 
Employment status at home in 
China   -  -  -  22.405   1.000   5.375E+09
Political party membership in 
China  1.382   0.219  3.983   -  -  - 
Intended duration of stay in 
S.Korea   2.819   0.008  16.760   2.545   0.002   12.743  
Income difference  20.815  0.999  1.096E+09  20.577   0.000   8.639E+08
Constant   -
83.468  0.999 0.000    -
116.283   0.999   0.000  
*Estimated Odds   0.458   0.588     
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  4.149   0.843    10.227   0.115    
-2 Log likelihood  34.644    39.588      





Table 7 Continued  
 Post-1995 labour migration of Chosunjok (n=328)  
Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Explanatory variables 
B sig.  Exp(B) B  sig.  Exp(B) B sig.  Exp(B) B  sig.  Exp(B) 
Age at time of migration  0.375   0.197   1.455   0.408  0.152  1.504  -  -  0.518  0.057  1.679 
Family status  0.631   0.102   1.879   0.614  0.107  1.848  0.639  0.016  1.895   -  -  - 
Marital status  -0.040   0.928   0.961   -0.055  0.899  0.946  -  -  -  0.598  0.046  1.819 
Level of education  1.629   0.000   5.097   1.491  0.000   4.442  1.503  0.000   4.495   -  -  - 
Type of school(s) attended in China  0.155   0.604   1.168   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Type of occupation in China  -0.338   0.232   0.713   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Employment status at home in China   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.915  0.135  2.496 
Political party membership in China  -0.573   0.039   0.564   -0.538  0.049  0.584  -0.627 0.018 0.534         
Intended duration of stay in S.Korea   1.855   0.000   6.390   1.857  0.000   6.404  1.866  0.000   6.462   1.893  0.000   6.636 
Income difference  1.295   0.137   0.026   -  -  -  -  -  -  1.076  0.197  2.932 
Constant   -3.654   0.000   0.026   -2.371  0.000   0.093  -2.144  0.000   0.117       
*Estimated Odds   1.686   1.679     1.281  1.651    
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  16.288  0.038     11.719  0.164  3.548  0.616  7.738  0.258  
-2 Log likelihood  348.373   352.492     354.566   366.723    
Cox & Snell R-Square  0.243     0.233      0.228    0.199     






Table 8 shows associations between the basic human capital variables of the 
Chosunjok labour migrant pre-1995 and post-1995 according to legal status. In the 
case of the pre-1995 migrant once we control the year of migration, only two factors 
differ significantly according to their legal status: the temporary intention of stay and 
the difference in income. No other socio-demographic and economic factors are 
significantly associated with either illegal or legal labour migration pre-1995. 
In the post-1995 period, political party membership and intended duration of stay are 
significantly associated with illegal labour migration of Korean Chinese. There is 
clear evidence for a larger volume of legally immigrating Chosunjok Korean Chinese 
aged over 40 in the post-1995 period, as shown in the descriptive statistics of the 
surveyed Chosunjok migrant population (Table 3). However, the results of the chi-
square distribution analysis, as illustrated in Table 8, demonstrate a weak influence 
of the older age variable on the economically-determined migration of the Korean 
Chinese to South Korea, both in the pre-1995 and the post-1995 periods.  
Detailed evidence for the minor role of the age variable and the age-specific policy in 
the sample population canvassed in 2003 is as follows. Firstly, the minimum age 
restriction has been dramatically reduced from 60 in the early 1990s, to 25 in 2003. 
Since 2000, the Korean government’s policy on ethnic migrants from China and the 
former Soviet Union has been greatly liberalised.  
 
Second, there has been remarkable development in the organisation of the illegal 
flow of Korean Chinese using forged documents. Korean authorities may have 
turned a blind eye to ambiguous visas because of the ways in which identity 
documents such as passports, family registration certificates and age of Korean 
Chinese have been professionally counterfeited. However, many have also simply 
gone undetected by officials. The prevalence of forged personal documents (often 
related to an ancestor’s contribution to independence activities against the Japanese 
during the colonial regime, or of relatives in South Korea) is due to the priority for 
admittance and eligibility for naturalisation set by the Korean government.   
These circumstances further imply that although the earlier prioritised entry policy 
for older people (which continued through the mid-1990s) had facilitated the flow of 





having children cannot be seen as a direct result of the government’s age selection 
policy. The actual influence of the age preference policy on the large volume of 
older-age and illegal migration of Chosunjoks to South Korea is considered relatively 
minor.  
 
On the other hand one must take note of the rapidly growing professional business of 
illegal immigration among both Chosunjok and Han Chinese communities, which 
has made ‘pseudo-legal’ China-to-Korea migration increasingly common. This 
remains to be another implicit raison d'être for a higher level of ‘dejure’ authorised 
migration of older generation Korean Chinese in comparison to younger and single 
migrants.  
According to the primary survey, 1.8% of the total respondents said they smuggled 
themselves to South Korea, while 36.5% reported to have been de jure officially 
admitted to the country of destination by using manipulated passports and other 
documents. Paper falsification is commonly done through organised dealers in illegal 







 Table 8. Chi-Square analysis of economically determined migration to Korea in the pre-1995 and post-1995 periods of migration by 
legal status    
Before 1995 (n=43)  From 1995 onward (n=328) 
Mode of migration  Mode of migration 
Illegal (n=32)  Legal (n=11)  Illegal (n=251)  Legal (n=77) 
Independent variables 
Χ2 Sig.(2-tailed)  χ2 Sig.(2-tailed)  χ2 Sig.(2-tailed)  χ2 Sig.(2-tailed) 
Age at time of migration   0.349  0.703  0.637  1.000  0.508  0.548  5.975  0.018 
Sex  0.037  0.982  0.463 0.496  1.030  0.598 0.118  0.943 
Family  status  0.518  0.683  0.917 0.564  2.154  0.182 3.694  0.067 
Marital status   0.194  1.000  0.543  1.000  3.081  0.098  2.781 0.080 
Level of education  0.015  1.000  0.196  1.000  4.222  0.073  4.146 0.056 
Type of (ethnic) school(s) attended in 
China  1.208  0.346  1.397 0.491  2.061  0.165 0.435  0.583 
Type of occupation in China  3.124  0.128  0.637  1.000  0.005  1.000  0.048  1.000 
Employment status in China  -  -  4.950  0.182  0.091  1.000  2.961  0.149 
Political party membership in China 0.276  0.712  0.020 1.000  3.919  0.051  2.306 0.186 
Intended duration of stay  9.349  0.005  0.637 1.000 29.170  0.000  15.281  0.000 
Income difference   4.693  0.091  0.244 1.000  4.373  0.070  1.456 0.253 






The following determination is clear from the logistic regression analysis shown in 
Reference Model A of Table 9: While the criteria of having lower education and 
having attended only ethnic Korean school are positively related to illegal migration 
in the post-1995,period, the criteria of being unskilled and a non-Communist Party 
member at home in China are negatively related to post-1995 illegal migration..  
Conversely, the latter statistical results indicate no positive association between 
negatively selected human capitals and illegal labour migration in the concerning 
period. My assumption regarding communist party membership (having non-
communist party membership as a low/negative human capital variable) is based 
upon the following argument: Those who are members of the communist party are 
likely to have stable socioeconomic status based on good social networks established 
through (and in) the state bureaucracy, and are therefore less likely to undertake risky 
and low-rewarding foreign labour than those from a sociopolitical background of 
non-communist party membership. However, in both the chi-square correlation 
analyses of Table 8 and the logistic regression analysis of Table 9 (see model C), the 
effect of having communist party membership on target earning economic migration 
of the Chosunjok appears to be strong.  
These results remind of the prevailing market transition theory of Nee (1989), which 
argues that due to a shift from the state socialism’s bureaucratic power control to the 
power of market institutions there is a negative effect of party membership in the 
marketised sector of the emerging urban economy. From this viewpoint, people who 
were privileged and better-off in pre-reform Chinese society are also likely to 
undertake risky and labour intensive international migration.  
However, without further tests using more sophisticated sociopolitical variables, a 
true interpretation of the positive relationship between communist party membership 
and both the legal and illegal labour migration of Korean Chinese to Korea (and vice 
versa) remains tricky.  
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 Table 9 Log likelihood of illegal labour migration of Chosunjok in the post-1995 migration in relation to selected explanatory variables 
    Response variable 
    Illegal economic migration of Chosunjoks in the post-1995 period (n=251) 
Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D 
Explanatory variables  
B Sig.  Exp(B)  B Sig.  Exp(B)  B  Sig.  Exp(B) B  Sig.  Exp(B) 
Age at time of migration  0.071  0.840  1.073  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.228  0.492  1.256 
Family status  -0.603  0.285  0.547  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Marital status  1.078  0.080  2.938  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.608  0.086  1.836 
Level of education  0.896  0.098  2.450  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Type of school(s) attended in China  0.341  0.334  1.407  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Type of occupation in China  -0.132  0.685  0.876  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Employment status at home in 
China   - -  -  - -  - -  -  -  0.555  0.415  1.742 
Political party membership in China  -0.634  0.054  0.530 -0.602  0.046  0.547 -0.602 0.046  0.547  -  -  - 
Intended duration of stay in 
S.Korea  1.725 0.000  5.613  1.618 0.000  5.041 1.618  0.000  5.041 1.635  0.000  5.127 
Income difference  2.504  0.049  12.232  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.106  0.090  8.212 
Constant   -3.804  0.009  0.022  0.144  0.617  1.155  0.144  0.617  1.155  -2.881  0.029  0.056 
Estimated Odds  2.968     2.836     2.836     1.123     
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test  7.313 0.503    0.238 0.888    0.238  0.888    3.014  0.698   
-2 Log likelihood  255.184    267.523    267.523     264.087     
Cox & Snell R-Square  0.160    0.118    0.118     0.130     










However, model C tested with those variables which have significant p-value from the chi-
squared test results indicates the intention of a temporary stay (labour) as the strongest 
determinant of illegal labour migration among the Chosunjok post-1995. This therefore supports 






This study has attempted to reveal the much neglected economic dimension of the ethnic 
population movement from China to South Korea in an exploratory way.  
Ethnic migration has been widely presumed to be a ‘mythic return’ responding to the call of the 
homeland. However, the multivariate models of this study underpin intertwined determinants of 
the new economics of ethnic migration at both macro and micro levels. Findings confirm that the 
Korean Chinese are not the traditionally dominant neo-classical economic migrants primarily 
seeking individual well-being. This is demonstrated in the dominant migration behaviour of 
Korean Chinese, who volunteer to undertake and endure low status, temporary labour in their 
capitalist ancestral country in order to meet the growing financial demands of the family in post-
reform China. 
 
The analyses’ findings on post-1995 migration of Korean Chinese to Korea show a strong 
association between movement and the regional post-reform economic restructuring in the origin 
economy of Northeast China. This is most notably seen to have affected the aspirational Korean 









In particular, the strong association between older adults with children and the economically 
determined migration of Chosunjoks, demonstrated in chi-square analyses, attests to the Korean 
Chinese parents’ strong commitment to the sound education of their children.  
 While commitment to educational achievement has traditionally been a dominant trait among 
Confucian East Asian nations, rising demand for higher education and targeting foreign labour of 
Chosunjoks post-1990 can be seen as a response to the structural change of the rapidly 
developing Chinese economy that increasingly seeks skilled labour.  
 
Given the short history of Chosunjok Korean Chinese’ migration, further investigation into the 
emerging global labour diaspora is required. More recently, there has been an increase in the 
flow of young Chosunjok students. They are seen as a key source of the highly sought after 
bilingual and skilled labour force from China which includes the engineers and business 
managers the global high-tech economy needs. Investigation into the emerging international 
skilled migration of the Chinese of Korean descent, and in particular implications of the 
movement for transnational development of Northeast China, remains a key agenda for future 
studies.  
Finally, the findings remind us that the growing foreign labour migration to South Korea is 
interwoven with the increasing labour demand of the ageing South Korean economy. In the 
international development context, the Northeast China-to-South Korea population movement 
presents one of the atypical South-North migration movements observed in the new core tier of 
the global economy which was previously and predominantly an origin zone of international 
labour migration. The demographic transition implications for both the sending and the new 
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